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Resale of Restricted Securities under
SEC Rule 144
When a corporation offers to sell its securities to the public, it is
required by the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter 1933 Act]1 to file
a detailed registration statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and to deliver a prospectus to each offeree.2 The object
of-registration is to provide the investing public with the information
needed to make intelligent investment decisions.
Because the registration process is both time-consuming and ex-
pensive, a statutory exemption from registration for securities sold
privately provides an attractive alternative to a public offering. The
issuer, by selling securities privately, is able to raise funds without
incurring the delay and expense of registration. Private placement is
equally attractive to investors, who often purchase the securities on
terms more favorable than those in a public offering.
Difficult questions arise, however, when the purchaser of privately
placed securities decides to resell those securities to the public. The
Commission has attempted to define the circumstances under which
the public resale of unregistered, privately placed securities does not
pose the dangers that the 1933 Act sought through registration to avert.
The most recent effort of the Commission to deal with this ques-
tion is embodied in SEC Rule 144,3 which became effective in April
1972. The rule seeks to protect the public by requiring anyone who
resells privately placed securities to demonstrate compliance with
several objectively-measurable conditions. Under the pre-Rule 144
administrative practice, the "intent" of the person reselling was a
crucial element in the determination of whether public resale would
be permitted without registration. Ascertainment of intent involved
a case-by-case evaluation of a variety of facts surrounding the resale.
The holder of restricted securities may now elect to have his actions
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-(aa) (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act, with sections as re,
numbered by Act of August 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 12, 78 Stat. 58].
2. 1933 Act § 5.
3. SEC Rule 144, 37 Fed. Reg. 596 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rule 144], SEC Se-
curities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972). Earlier versions of the rule are set out In
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5186 (Sept. 10, 1971), SEC Securities Act Release No.
5087 (Sept. 15, 1969). The original proposals for a rule specifying objective standards
to govern resale of restricted securities were made in SEC, DiscLosUm. TO INVESTORS
Appendix VI-1 at 149-247 (CCH ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as WiiFAT REI'OrT; Whcat
chaired the special committee that wrote the recommendations].
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evaluated either under the traditional "intent" standard or the new
Rule 144 standard. As a practical matter, however, Rule 144 is likely
to be favored by purchasers of restricted securities, because it makes
resale more certain and predictable than does the "intent" standard.
This Note will examine the probable impact of Rule 144 on pri-
vate placements and will evaluate the protective value of its require-
ments. It will be argued that Rule 144 weakens the public protection
the securities laws were intended to provide.
I. Private Financing under the Securities Act of 1933
The basic premise of the 1933 Act is that the offer to sell or sale
of any security requires registration.4 Congress, however, specifically
exempted from registration certain types of securities and transac-
tions for which it was thought there was no practical need for regis-
tration. Two exemptions in particular concern this Note. The first
is the Section 4(2) "private placement" exemption for "transactions
by an issuer.., not involving a public offering."" This exempts a com-
pany's specific or isolated sale of its securities to a limited number of
persons6 who have access to the kind of information registration would
provide.7 The provision embodies the policy judgment that the sale
of an issue of securities, usually debt,8 to a small group of profes-
sional investors is not the concern of the federal government.0 The
wealthy individuals and institutional investors who purchase such
4. H.R. RaP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1933); Landis, The Legislative History
of the Securities Act, 28 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 29, 37 (1959).
5. 1933 Act § 4(2).
6. The SEC has never promulgated a numerical limit to the number of permissible
offerees in a private placement, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962);
SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935). However, if the number of offerees
is large the transaction may be held to be a public offering. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1938) (offering of shareholder receipts to 530 persons); Martin Yale Industries, Inc.,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. SEc. L. RaP. 78,673 (1972) (offer to 46 emplo)es):
The offer need not be made to investors at large, or the sale transacted on a national
exchange, to be a "public offering." Strahan v. Pedroni, 387 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1970). In
fact, an offer to as few as twenty-five individuals may be found to be a public offering.
Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
The number of permissible offerees often appears to be inversely related to the level
of sophistication and access to information about the issuer. But even wherc the in-
vestors are concededly sophisticated, an offer to a large group may be a public offering.
See Hazel Bishop, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 718 (1961) (offer to 500 sophisticated investors con-
sidered a public offering).
7. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.,
BNA SEc. Rae. L. REP. No. 155 at H-I (5th Cir. 1972). rev'g 326 F. Supp. 583 (S.D. Fla.
1971).
8. In 1971, eighty-three per cent of privately placed securities were debt issues. SEC,
STA=xrsCAL BULLXrN 18-19 (March 1972).
9. Landis, supra note 4, at 37.
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unregistered securities10 presumably have the economic bargaining
power and sophistication to protect themselves. 1
The private placement exemption would be a major loophole if
the general policy of registration could be evaded by a private sale to
a small number of sophisticated investors who in turn could sell
the unregistered securities to the public. Thus, one requirement of
a bona fide private placement is that it cannot be made to individuals
who buy for resale to the public.' 2 If a purchaser is found to be a
mere conduit' 3 for a wider distribution, the initial unregistered sale
to persons reasonably expected to market them to the public would
be one involving a public offering.'4 Even though the corporate is-
suer does not make the ultimate sale of the unregistered securities
to the public, it may be held liable for the purchase price in an action
by public purchasers of the securities. 15
The second relevant exemption from registration is that in Sec-
tion 4(1), for "ordinary trading transactions" between individual
members of the investing public.10 If the purchaser of a private place-
10. Though precise figures are not available, the major part of unregistered cash
offerings has been private sales to institutional investors. I REPORT OF TIlE SIECIAL
STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE S.E.C., H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess,
483 (1963).
11. In Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CC FE. SEC.
L. REP. 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the court refused to permit a sale of unregistered
stock to be rescinded under § 12(1) of the 1933 Act. The plaintiff mutual fund
possessed enough information to demand, and enough leverage at the bargaining
table to receive, all information relevant to make a fully informed decision on whether
or not to buy Hoffman stock.
Id. at 94,970. See also Orrick, Some Observations on the Administration of the Securities
Laws, 42 MINN. L. REV. 25, 33 (1957). This presumption of access to information Is
rebuttable. For example, in United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675
(4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967), "businessmen of mature experience"
were shown not to have access to information of the type registration would provide.
Recent cases on the subject are SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., BNA, SEC. REo. L,
REP. No. 155, at H-1 (5th Cir. 1972); Henderson v. Hayden Stone Inc. [Current] CCII
FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,504 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. American int'l Franchises,
448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Lively v. Hershfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
12. SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev., 280 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afI'd in
part, vacated in part on other grounds, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Bond and
Share Corp., 229 F. Supp. 88 (W.D. Okla. 1963); SEC v. Mono-Kearsage Consol. Mning
Co., 167 F. Supp. 248 (D. Utah 1958); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4162 (Dee. 2, 1959).
13. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
14. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4162 (Dec. 2, 1969); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957); Ambrosia Minerals Inc., 39 S.E.C. 734 (1960); Elliott & Co.,
38 S.E.C. 381 (1958).
15. Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who . ..offers or sells a security in violation of Section 6 . . . shall
be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon, upon the tender of such security, or
for damages if he no longer owns the security.
See, e.g., Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1971).
16. "The provisions of Section 5 shall not apply to transactions by any person other
than an insurer, underwriter, or dealer . 1933 Act § 4(1). See H.R. REP. No. 85,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1933).
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ment is to sell those securities publicly, he must meet the terms of
this section. So far as is here relevant, the transaction may not in-
volve an underwriter.'7 A private placement purchaser is an under-
writer under the 1933 Act if he "purchases unregistered securities
from an issuer with a view to distribution."' 8
"Distribution" is not defined in the 1933 Act, but has traditionally
been construed to be synonymous with the term "public offering" in
Section 4(2). 19 This reading of the two sections has permitted unregis-
tered securities to be sold to the public through an intermediate pri-
vate sale, if the purchaser in that private sale did not buy "with a view
to" reselling the securities to the public.
To illustrate the scope of the exemption, consider a person who
acquires securities through an unregistered private placement. A pri-
vate resale of these restricted securities would be permitted under
Section 4(1). Since the securities are not moving from the issuer to
the public, the transaction is not a "distribution," i.e., public offer-
ing, and the seller, by definition, cannot be an underwriter. On the
other hand, a public sale by a private placement purchaser might not
be permitted under Section 4(1), for he may be acting as an under-
writer if he purchased with a view to distribution or public resale.
The broad purpose of the 1933 Act to require registration has meant
that even a non-professional may be classified as an underwriter by
the statute's terms.
Under the pre-Rule 144 practice, however, a person purchasing
with a pure "investment intent" as opposed to a "view to distribu-
tion" has been free to change his mind and dispose of his unregistered
holdings without thereby becoming an underwriter.20 This has com-
17. See note 16 supra.
18. The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution
of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such
undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect under-
taking of such undertaking; but such term shall not include a person whose interest
is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual
and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in this paragraph tLe
term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indi-
rectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect
common control with the issuer.
1933 Act § 2(11).
19. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466-68 (2d Cir. 1959); Oklahoma
Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764, 769 (1937), afj'd, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1939); L. Loss, SE-
CUmITIEs RtcuATiox 551 (temp. student ed. 1961); Orrick, egistration Problems under
the Federal Securities Act: Resales following Rule 133 and Exchange Transactions, 10
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (1958). See p. 1575 supra.
20. See L. Loss, supra note 19, at 551. Recent illustrations are found in two SEC
"no action" letters. Keene, Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. SEc. L. RUT.
78,539 (restricted stock permitted to be sold for tax reasons). American All-Serus
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plicated the task of keeping the private placement private, for tile
availability of the Section 4(1) exemption for the resale of unregis-
tered securities has been thereby made dependent on the intent of
the purchaser at the time of the private placement.
Private placement purchasers seeking to demonstrate compliance
with this standard invariably have delivered to the issuer a "letter of
investment intent" representing and warranting that the securities are
acquired without a view to distribution.2 1 Since this document is es-
sentially self-serving it has been of little value. In the effort to dis-
cover the purchaser's original intent, the staff of the SEC has looked
to a number of facts surrounding a proposed resale of restricted se-
curities.2 2 Increasing reliance, however, has been placed on the length
of time the securities have been held,23 perhaps on the theory that
securities held for a long period of time were purchased for "invest-
ment" rather than "distribution." Although the SEC has stated that
purchase of restricted securities with a view to public sale at any fu-
ture date constitutes acquisition of securities with a view to distribu-
tion,2 4 it has been the common understanding of the bar that after a
"reasonable holding period" restricted stock may be publicly sold
without compliance with the registration requirements. 20
Notwithstanding the weight given the holding period, pre-Rule .144
practice retained the possibility that the purchaser of a private place-
ment would fail to qualify for a Section 4(1) exemption, and would
thus be unable to resell the securities publicly. The possibility of
being unable to sell the security was one good reason to investigate
the issuer carefully before accepting the private placement. In addi-
tion, potential liability under the 1933 Act created a strong incentive
for corporate issuers and transfer agents to police resales of restricted
Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,086 (1971) (financial re-
verses occurred; investment intent accepted). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 603
(Dec. 16, 1935); Comstock-Dexter Mines, Inc., 10 S.E.C. 358, 371 (1941).
21. See VHEAT REPORT, supra note 3, at 163.
22. The factors considered are indicated in SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552
(Nov. 6, 1962), and SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935). See also iIVnA'T
REPORT, supra note 3, at 162-74.
23. See, e.g., Product Applications, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Ftu.
SEc. L. REP. 77,980 (1971); Digital Data Systems, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCII
FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,982 (1971). The Commission, despite its practice, has in its official
pronouncements steadfastly rejected a definite holding period after which restricted
securities may be publicly sold without registration. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4248, at 6-7 (July 14, 1960).
24. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, at 3-4 (Nov. 6, 1962).
25. Committee on Securities Regulation of the Bar of the City of New York, Comment
Letter on Rule 144, at 21 (Oct. 14, 1971); see WnEAT REroRT, supra note 3, at 164.66;
Schneider, Acquisitions under the Federal Securities Acts: A Program for Reform, 116
U. PA. L. REv. 1323, 1337 (1968); Throop, Federal Regulation of Securities Committee:
Comments on the Wheat Report, 25 Bus. LAWYER 39, 46 (1969).
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securities.2 6 Nevertheless, the fact that private financing has remained
economically attractive both to issuers and to purchasers is shown by
the following statistic: In 1971, seventeen per cent of the gross pro-
ceeds of new corporate issues was raised privately.27
To understand the attractiveness of the private placement exemp-
tion to issuers of securities, it is necessary to know what is involved
in the registration required for a public offering. Registration under
the 1933 Act resembles an adversary process, with careful investiga-
tions being conducted by an independent undenvriter, the under-
writer's counsel, an independent accountant, and the staff of the
SEC.28 This process is an expensive one, involving counsel fees,
printing costs, SEC fees and underwriter's commissions.20 The total
costs of registration may range from three per cent of the gross pro-
ceeds in a very large offering to nearly twenty per cent in a small
one.30 Registration consumes time as well as money.31 Months of
delay are inherent in the process under the best of circumstances,32
and market conditions often cause undenvriters to further postpone
the offering.33 Besides these disadvantages, registration entails a
thorough investigation of an issuer's condition and public disclosure
of any adverse findings. A registered public offering will be
anathema to any issuer which suspects that full disclosure of its af-
fairs would impair its ability to sell its securities.34
26. A transfer agent may become a participant in a distribution of unregistered se-
curities in violation of Section 5 and thus be subject to Section 12 liability. SEC v. Les
Studs Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,087 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). For a discussion of some of the methods employed to inhibit marketability of
restricted stock, see Israels, Stop Transfer Procedures and the Securities Act of 1933:
Addendum to the Uniform Commercial Code-Article 8, 17 RuTGERs L. RE%. 158 (1962).
"Stop-transfer" procedures are discussed at length in SEC Securities Act Release No.
5121 (Dec. 30, 1970), and their importance is reaffirmed in SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5223, at 15 (Jan. 11, 1972).
27. SEC, STATISTICAL BULLETIN 19 (March 1972). The ratio of gross proceeds of privately
placed securities to new corporate issues fluctuates from year to year with changes in
interest rates and the general market tone. In the speculative bull markets of 1963.
1964, and 1965 the percentage of funds raised in private placements exceeded fifty per
cent. SEC, STATISTICAL BULLETIN 18 (March 1966). Despite the lower 1971 figure, there is
a secular trend away from public flotation of securities. See Benston, The Effectiveness
of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in EcoNo.!ic PoaC AND TIE RE U.
LATION OF CORPORATE SECuRrriEs 23, 67-72 (H. Manne ed. 1969).
28. The 1933 Act places heavy responsibility on undenvriters and their counsel to
exercise due diligence in making all material disclosures. See Complaint, SEC v. Na-
tional Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (S.D.N.Y., riled Feb. 3, 1972).
29. See, SEC, COST oF FLOTATION or REGISTERED Equrry IssuEs 1963-1965 (March 1970).
30. Id. at 10-11.
31. See Epley, Letter Stock Restrictions and Registration Procedure, in How To
INvEsr IN LE STOCK 7 (B. Makela ed. 1970).
32. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 3, at 76.
33. See Hurwitz, The Broker's Role in Letter Stock, in How To INvEsr IN LErEn
STOCK 23, 31 (B. Makela ed. 1970).
34. In fact private placements are particularly advantageous to issuers whose financial
status falls short of standards met by most public offerings. 5 SEC, INsTrruntoNAL IN-
VTSTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2414-16 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as INSTnTToNAL INvmsTOR STUDY REPORT].
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In contrast to public offerings, private placements characteristically
are informal, and the investigation conducted by purchasers is often
cursory.35 The delay and expense of registration are avoided. Also
avoided, should the issuer have something to hide, is the disclosure
of corporate affairs.36
The principal advantage of private placements to the purchaser
is the higher return that accompanies unregistered securities. 7 One
study found that unregistered stock was privately placed at an average
discount of twenty-three per cent from the market price.3s This in-
creased return represents compensation for the encumbered status of
the shares, the lower degree of disclosure, and part of the cost saving
realized by lack of registration."
In the case of debt securities, the return may be enhanced by sev-
eral devices. One is an interest yield higher than the market return;
another, sometimes termed an "equity kicker," may take the form
of packaging stock options or bargain price stock with the debt is-
sue.40 Gains to private placement purchasers in excess of 100 per
cent are not uncommon.
4 1
II. Rule 144
Rule 14442 enhances the relative attractiveness of private financing
by reducing the uncertainty that previously attended the public re-
35. In Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1050 (2d Cir. 1969) the private
placement purchaser was given a tour of the plant of the corporate issuer and verbal
assurances of a "tremendous backlog." In Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1961.
1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. fj 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the private place-
ment purchaser was a sophisticated professional investment advisory company. 'rthe
security analyst who studied the purchase, however, simply drew a few standard graphs
on the price performance and earnings trend of the corporate issuer.
For a factual description of circumstances surrounding one private placement of three
million shares, see Jacobs v. Tenney, 316 F. Supp. 151 (D. Del. 1970). See also Kaufinan
v. Diversified Indus., 40 U.S.L.W. 2818 (2d Cir. May 22, 1972); SEC Securities and Ex.
change Act Release No. 9478 (Feb. 9, 1972).
36. If the issuer subsequently raises funds in an independent public offering, it
must disclose all unregistered security sales within two years. 1933 Act Schedule A. For
an example of the operation of this section see Hazel Bishop Inc., 40 S.E.C. 718, 729
(1961). See generally Epley, supra note 31; Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
37. A. COnAN, YIELDS ON CORPORATE DEnT DIRECTLY PLACED 22 (1967); 5 INSrI IIHONAL
INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, supra note 34, at 2414-16; Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
The higher rate of return on privately placed securities has prompted the formation of
several mutual funds investing primarily in restricted securities. See, e.g., PROSPECTUS or
FEDERATED INCOME AND PRIVATE PLACEMENT FUND (1972). See generally Hurwitz, supra
note 33, at 23-24.
38. 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, supra note 34, at 2414-16.
39. Id.
40. See sources cited in note 37 supra.
41. See sources cited in note 37 supra.
42. 37 Fed. Reg. 596 (1962). See note 3 supra.
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sale of restricted securities. 43 The rule provides that the purchaser
of privately placed securities may publicly resell them in brokerage
transactions if the following conditions are met: (1) the issuing com-
pany must either be current in filing its reports under the 1934 Se-
curities and Exchange Act 44 or, if not covered by that Act,45 there
must be publicly available certain information about the company
specified in the rule,46 (2) the prospective reseller must have been
the full beneficial owner of the restricted securities for at least two
years,47 (3) his sales of restricted securities, during any six-month
period, must not exceed one per cent of the outstanding shares or
other units of the class of the restricted holding.48
The ultimate goal of Rule 144, as of all securities regulation, is
the protection of the investing public. The same goal lay behind pre-
Rule 144 regulations of private placement resales. There has not been
a change of goals, but a change of the means by which the continu-
ing goal is to be attained. Previously, public protection seems to have
rested heavily on the incentive for careful screening of securities by
private placement purchasers created by the uncertainty inherent in
the "intent" test. The uncertainty, and the motive it supposedly
generated, naturally decreased as the length of the holding period
became the primary factor assessed in permitting resale.
Rule 144 abandons any attempt to protect the public by fostering
uncertainty among private purchasers. The purchaser knows before
making the purchase that he will be able to resell publicly. Instead,
the rule relies on the existence of specified objectively-measurable
43. See p. 1578 supra.
44. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is hereinafter referred to as the 1934
Act. Amendments to the annual periodic report, Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1972),
and the quarterly report, Form l0-Q. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (1972), under the 1934 Act,
now require the registrant to include a statement that it has complied with the infor-
mation requirements of Rule 144. 37 Fed. Reg. 600 (1972).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(1), 78(o)(d) (1970) indicate which companies must file periodic
reports under the 1934 Act.
46. Rule 144(c)(2) refers to paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 15c2-11 i under the 1934 Act,
which requires disclosure of, among other things, the exact name of the is3uer, the
address of its principal executive offices, the exact title and class of the security, the
number of shares or total amount of the security outstanding, the nature and extent
of the issuer's facilities, the product or service offered, and financial information con-
cerning the issuer including its most recent balance sheet and profit and loss statement,
which shall be reasonably current. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11(a)(4) (1972). These items
should be compared with the exhaustive 1933 Act disclosure required by Schedule A.
1933 Act Schedule A.
47. Rule 144(d).
48. Rule 144(e). If the securities are admitted to trading on a national exchange
the limit is the lesser of (1) one per cent of the shares outstanding or (2) the average
weekly reported volume of trading in such securities on all securities exchanges during
the four calendar weeks preceding the filing of Form 144, which gives notice of the
proposed resale.
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conditions, which, if present, are regarded as providing the needed
public protection. Underlying the Rule 144 requirements is the judg-
ment that the unregistered public resale of privately placed securities
does not present dangers to the public if (1) adequate information
about the issuer is publicly available,4 o (2) the private purchaser as-
sumes the "full economic risks of investment" for a two-year period,50
and (3) the quantity sold does not disrupt the marketY1 It will be
argued below that these three conditions are not achieved by Rule 144.
A. Adequacy of Information about the Issuer
The test used in Rule 144 to establish the availability of adequate
information about the issuer, for companies subject to the 1934 Act,
is that the issuer be current in filing its required periodic reports
with the SEC.G2 Companies not subject to the 1934 Act, must make
"publicly available" some (but not all) of the information contained
in a 1934 Act periodic report.53
This test is deficient as to both the adequacy and availability of
the information it generates. Useful comparison may be made with
the information disclosed in a 1933 Act registration of a public of-
fering.54
Periodic reports under the 1934 Act contain much less detail than
the registration statements required for a public offering by the 1933
Act. r  One difference particularly worth noting is that a 1933 Act
49. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, at 7-8 (Jan. 11, 1972).
50. Id. at 8-10.
51. Id. at 10-11.
52. Rule 144(c)(1).
53. Rule 144(c)(2). See note 46 supra.
54. This single comparison will not, of course, resolve the issue of the adequacy of
the Rule 144 requirement, since the entire bundle of provisions contained in the rule,
and not merely the information requirement, is the substitute for the protections ac.
corded by 1933 Act registration. However, a proper evaluation of the rule as a whole
requires an understanding of the disclosure gap existing between the rule and the 1933
Act. This comparison should not be understood as a criticism of 1934 Act periodic re-
porting. Periodic reporting standards have been considerably upgraded to expose adverse
financial developments with relative completeness and speed. Continuous disclosure,
however, of information as comprehensive as 1933 Act disclosure would be excessively
costly. It is for this reason that the stricter standards'of 1933 Act disclosure and liability
are triggered only by a public offering. The comparison is justified because the economic
effect of a Rule 144 sale is the same as that ot a public offering. Both cases result ]it
an infusion of public-market ftinds into the issuer's business.
55. The potential for misleading the public should not be underestimated even for
major listed companies which report under the 1934 Act. In 1968, Omega Equities was
a reporting company with its shares traded over the counter. Omega Equities, Docket
No. 0-188, SEC, DIRECTORY OF COMPANIEs FILING ANNUAL REPORTS (1969). Significant quan-
tities of its shares outstanding were unregistered, having been sold in private placencnts.
The company is now defunct. See Jacobs v. Tenney, 316 F. Supp. 151 (D. Del. 1970).
In 1969, when Penn Central's financial situation was rapidly deteriorating, It caused
the Pennsylvania Co., its wholly-owned investment subsidiary, to raise 535,000,000 through
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registration statement discloses the use to be made of the funds raised
by the sale.56 No such accounting is made in the 1934 Act report.57
Moreover, the 1934 Act report is produced by the reporting com-
pany alone, without the benefit of the multiple-party, adversary in-
vestigation of the company characteristic of a 1933 Act registration. 3
As to companies not subject to the 1934 Act, the information re-
quirements of the rule are even less stringent.5 9 Since these com-
panies are small, often unseasoned enterprises, 0 one may wonder why
they are held to a standard of information lower than that applied
to the larger, experienced companies which report under the 1934
Act. 61
Nor is it clear why all reporting companies are treated the same.
Conceivably, different quanta and kinds of information would be
desirable from different kinds of reporting companies-major report-
ing companies, deficit ridden reporting companies, those involved
in substantial litigation, and so on.0 2 The stark distinction between
a private placement. SEC, STAFF STUDY OF THE FINANCIAL COLLALPSE OF PEINN CwnmAL
COMPANY, excerpt in [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (, 78,931 at 82,011 (1972). The
staff report further showed that the unwillingness of underwriters and independent
counsel (after scrutiny of company records) to endorse a public offering made it im-
possible for Penn Central to offer its securities. Id. at 82,007. Without the purgative
"housecleaning" effect of 1933 Act registration and the attendant publicity of a public
offering, mismanagement may be insulated from public view for some time.
The staff of the SEC has in addition taken the position in recent "no action" letters
that deficiencies in periodic reports or lack of an unqualified accountants' opinion will
not nullify a 1934 Act filing for the purposes of Rule 144, except where the deficiencies
are part of a plan to circumvent the public information requirements. Electronic
Transistors Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REt. 78,974 (1972); Dynarad, Inc.,
[Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,917 (1972).
56. See 1933 Act Schedule A and Item 3, Form S-I, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1972).
57. See Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1972); WurAT REP.RT, supra note 3, at 113.
58. Underwriters in a public offering are subject to a statutory duty to exercise
due diligence in making full disclosure of material fact in a 1933 Act registration. 1933
Act § ll(a)(4). See Complaint, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72
(SD.N.Y., filed Feb. 3, 1972).
59. See note 46 supra.
60. Registration and reporting under the 1934 Act is not required of issuers unless
they are engaged in interstate commerce, have total assets exceeding $1,000,000, and
have outstanding a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more persons. 15 U.S.C.§ 78(1)(g)(1) (1970).
61. The WHEAT REPORT concluded that, generally, favorable resale treatment should
be given only to holders of restricted securities issued by reporting companies. WHErAT
REPORT, supra note 3, at 205-10.
62. The distinctions suggested in the text are the basis of the qualifications for the
use of registration on short forms. These rules make simplified disclosure available to
a limited number of reporting companies. For example, Form S-8, 17 C.F.R. § 239.16(b)(1972), is limited to offerings to employees under qualified pension, profit sharing, or
stock bonus plans. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3480 (June 16, 1953). Form S-9, 17
C.F.R. § 239-22 (1972), is limited to reporting companies selling high grade non-con-
vertible debt securities. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3509 (July 21, 1954). Forms S-7,
17 C.F.R. § 239.26 (1972), and S-16, 17 C.F.R. § 239.27 (1972), are available only to
reporting companies which have complied in all respects with the 1934 Act for the
three years prior to filing. The issuer must also have had net income of at least $500.000
for each of the five fiscal years preceding filing; and must not have defaulted on any
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reporting companies on the one hand and non-reporting ones on the
other is not completely responsive to the public's need for information.
The second weakness of the rule's information requirement con-
cerns the "availability" of the information. Again by way of illustra-
tive comparison, the 1933 Act requires that each prospective pur-
chaser be supplied a prospectus.63 Rule 144, by contrast, does not
require delivery of a prospectus to purchasers or even to members
of a national exchange. 64 Reports are simply filed with the SEC,05
under the standard of availability automatically set by the 1934 Act.
No attempt is made to insure dissemination of the periodic reports
to the investing public. Furthermore, the rule contains no standard
by which to judge the public availability of the information required
of non-reporting companies. 66
B. The Full Economic Risks of Investment
The Commission argues that a two year holding period subjects
purchasers in a private placement to the "full economic risks of in-
vestment." 67 Requiring the securities to be beneficially owned and
fully paid for by the seller at least two years prior to resale, it is said,
will prevent him from acting as a "conduit" for the sale of unregis-
tered securities to the public.68 The underlying notion is that the
risk of price decline during the mandatory holding period will en-
courage purchasers to buy wisely. Conceding for purposes of argu-
ment that a two- year period of investment risk is long enough to
generate vigilance among private placement purchasers, one may
interest payment, preferred stock dividend, sinking fund installment, or long tern
lease rental payment within ten years. Moreover, a sale pursuant to Form S-16 must
be effected on a national exchange and a prospectus must be delivered to all exchange
members. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5100 (Dec. 16, 1970); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5117 (Dec. 23, 1970). For recent changes in the use of Forms S-7 and S.16,
see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5265 (June 27, 1972).
The authors of the WHFxT REPORT appear to have considered the idea of distinguish-
ing among reporting companies, but rejected it in the interest of simplicity. WnrAT
REPORT, supra note 3, at 195.
63. 1933 Act § 5(b).
64. Compare prospectus delivery requirements for Form S.16. See note 62 supra.
65. Financial analysts have long complained about the inadequate dissemination of
1934 Act periodic reports. See, e.g., Carlson, Corporate Information and Disclosure, 28
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 94 (1972).
66. The staff of the SEC has indicated in an unpublished "no action" letter that
guidelines concerning the availability of public information are to be announced in an
interpretative release. George D.B. Bonbright & Co., summary reproduced in BNA
SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 167 at C-2 (1972).
67. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, at 6, 8 (Jan. 11, 1972).
68. Id. One reason the one year holding period suggested in the WHEAT REI'ORT Was
rejected was that it "would result in sale of large amounts of unregistered securities to
the public." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087, at 3 (Sept. 22, 1970).
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still wonder whether the rule actually subjects purchasers to the "full
economic risks of investment" during this period.
In order to prevent a private placement purchaser from hedging
his investment risk, a provision was added to the final draft of Rule
144 suspending the computation of the holding period whenever the
holder has a "short position" in, or holds an option to sell, units of
the same class or units convertible into the same class as the re-
stricted security.6 Innovative as this provision is, it nonetheless per-
mits substantial hedging. The private placement purchaser can reduce
investment risk not only by using short sales and options to sell, but
also by taking advantage of the effect of Rule 144's abolition of the
"fungibility doctrine" 70 and its treatment of convertible securities,",
and by selling restricted stock through affiliates.12
Short Sales and Acquisitions of Puts. A short sale is simply the sale
of a borrowed security,7 3 and a put is an option to sell a share at a
specified price during a specified period.74 By selling short or ac-
quiring a put in the quantity of a security held, the holder is com-
pletely insulated against loss. Any loss resulting from a price decline
is exactly matched by the gain generated by the put or short sale. Of
course, the converse is true, so the holder in such a case would lose
any profit from a price increase. The holder of a restricted securi-
ty, however, may be willing to avoid both gain and loss during the
two years, and on resale would make his profit from the discount he
received when he purchased the security.
One weakness of the short sale provision in Rule 144 is that its
application is limited to certain kinds of stock-stock of the same
69. Rule 144(d)(3).
70. See p. 1587 infra.
71. See pp. 1587-89 infra.
72. See pp. 1589-90 infra.
73. In a short sale the security is usually borrowed from the broker executing the
transaction. Large brokerage houses maintain inventories of different securities that
are deposited with them by their customers for safekeeping. If a brokerage house does
not have a particular security in its inventory it often will borrow the security from
another brokerage house for the customer who wishes to make the short sale. The profit
on a short sale is made when the price of the stock goes dowi. The seller can then
repurchase at a lower price and return the share he borrowed. This operation is often
called "covering a short position." See the lucid explanation of short sales in P. S&%murxso.,
Ecoxomics 401 (8th ed. 1970).
74. The profit on a put, like that on a successful short sale, is made if the price of
the security goes down. A put entitles the holder to sell a security at a certain price(the striking price) within a certain period of time. If the price of the security falls, the
optionee may buy the security at the market price and exercise his put to sell at the
striking price. The difference between the striking price and the market price less the
cost of the option and brokerage commissions will be his profit. See R. BAicln, H.
TORGERSON & H. GUTH.MANN, INVESTMEN-r PRmNcitLEs AxD PR cricEs 76 (6th ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as. INVESTMENT PRINCILES].
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class or stock which is convertible into securities of the same class
as the restricted holding.D All equity securities reflect the underlying
value of the issuing company,-' and price changes for equity securi-
ties of the same issuer are highly correlated. 77 Thus a holder of re-
stricted equity securities may protect his position by shorting a share
which is neither the equivalent of, nor convertible into, securities of
the same class as his restricted holding.78
Furthermore, the rule fails to recognize that the prices of all se-
curities are interrelated, and that the risk of a portfolio may be sub-
stantially lower than the risk of a particular security.71 Even if se-
curities of the same issuer not convertible into the restricted class
are unavailable, Rule 144 will not prevent minimization of invest-
ment risk through short sales and acquisition of puts of other se-
curities. Especially high degrees of correlation may be expected in
the price fluctuations of securities of companies in the same industry
or of companies producing complementary products. 80 So long as
there is any positive correlation, i.e., the prices of the two securities
move in the same direction, 8' it is possible to minimize the overall
risk of a portfolio by acquiring a put on, or by selling short, the cor-
related stock.82 For example, selling short securities of battery, tire,
or spark plug manufacturing companies will minimize the risk in-
75. Rule 144(d)(3)(i). The running of the holding period on restricted debt securities
is suspended upon the short sale or acquisition of a put on an) debt security of the
issuer, regardless of convertibility into the restricted class. Rule 144(d)(3)(ii).
76. B. GRAHAM & D. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIs 410 (3d ed. 1931); INVESrMNr lFIN-
cIPLns, supra note 74, at 216-34.
77. The general principle of hedging is described in B. GIuIAm & D. DoDn, supra
note 76, at 545. More explicit strategies may be found in E. THOttP & S. KAssour, BAT
TIlE MARKET (1967).
78. To illustrate this principle assume an issuer has outstanding two classes of
common stock, which differ perhaps only in voting rights and which are not convertible
into shares of each class. Assume restricted shares of the first class are held by private
placement purchasers. An option to sell the shares of the second class will protect the
purchaser from price decline during the two-year period without suspending the running
of the computation of the length of time the securities have been held. A short sale
accomplishes the same result. The prices of the two securities can be expected to move
together. The loss on the restricted stock will be offset by the short sale profit. After
two years the position may be liquidated and the restricted holdings sold publicly vit
Rule 144.
79. See generally, H. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION
OF INVESTMENTS (1959).
80. Id. at 32. The statistical correlation among nine listed stocks is calculated in a
numerical example. Id. at 113. See also, F. RENWICK, INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENTS AND
FINANCE: THEORY AND ANALYSIS 448 (1971).
81. If prices are negatively correlated, no short sales are necessary to minimize in.
vestment risk. For example, purchasing securities of the proverbial ice and coal colmpanles,
Samuelson, General Proof that Diversification Pays, 25 J. or FIN. AND QUANT. ANALYSIS
1, 7-8 (1967), or in "war" and "peace" companies, Cohen, The Suitability Rule and
Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1611-141 (1970), would minimize portfolio risk.
82. See F. RENWICK, supra note 80, at 163-64, 426-35.
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volved in holding restricted securities of an automobile manufac-
turing company. Similar or superior protection might be gained by
shorting shares of another automobile manufacturer.
The Fungibility Doctrine. Rule 144 abolishes the "fungibility doc-
trine.183 Under that doctrine, securities acquired on the open market,
while the private placement purchaser held restricted holdings of the
same class, also became restricted as to resale. The underlying ra-
tionale of the fungibility doctrine was that it is inconsistent for a pri-
vate placement purchaser to make an investment representation with
respect to some shares and simultaneously to sell publicly other shares
representing fungible economic interests. 84
A subtle economic aspect of the fungibility doctrine was the im-
position of added investment risk on the purchaser of privately placed
securities. The fungibility doctrine subjected the holder of restricted
securities to illiquidity in later-acquired securities of tile same class as
those privately placed and hence created a strong incentive to fully in-
vestigate the affairs of the corporate issuer. Rule 144 removes this in-
centive by assuring those who acquire restricted securities in unregis-
tered transactions of the complete liquidity of later-acquired securities.
Convertible-Securities. A "convertible" is a senior security (debt or
preferred stock) which may be exchanged at the option of the holder
for common stock.8 5 This senior security typically entitles the holder
to priorities in liquidation or bankruptcy. The higher yield on pre-
ferred stock or debt, as well as the possibility of redemption by the
corporate issuer, will reduce the magnitude of market price fluctua-
83. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, at 9 (Jan. 11, 1972). Kleinbard, Bell &
Brecker, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP. 78,717 (1972).
The Commission had earlier concluded that a holding period would be of little
effect without a fungibility rule of some kind to prevent "rolling distribution." WrEAT
REPORT, supra note 3. at 201-02. Accordingly, all early versions of the rule preserved a
limited fungibility doctrine. Proposed Rule 144(d)(2), SEC Securities Act Release No.
4186 (Sept. 10, 1971); Proposed Rule 144(a)(l)(iii), SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087
(Sept. 22, 1970); Proposed Rule 162(c)(1), SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 4,
1969). For a pre-Rule 144 "no action" letter upholding fungibility, see Computer Auto-
mation, Inc., [Current] CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP. 78,848 (1972).
84. The doctrine was first enunciated and explained in two SEC decisions. Skiatron
Electronics and Television Corp., 40 S.E.C. 236 (1960), Lewissohn Copper Corp.. 38 S.E.C.
226 (1958). Even those critical of the fungibility rule recognize a need for some degree
of limitation on the intermixture of purchases and sales of restricted stock. See, e.g.,
Samet, The Concept of Fungibility in the Securities Laws, 27 Bus. LIIast 383 (1972).
85. In "no action" letters, the staff of the SEC has taken the position that a note
which may be exchanged for common stock only when accompanied by the wmarrant
issued with the note is not a "convertible security" under Rule 144(d)(4)(B). Wright
Airlines, Inc., [Current] CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP. 1 78,937 (1972); Microform Data Systems,
Inc., [Current] CCH Fan. SEC. L. REP. 78,916 (1972). Thus, the term "convertible
securities" only embraces securities which may be exchanged for other securities without
any other consideration.
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tions.8 6 A senior security which is convertible into common stock also
assures the holder of participation in the price appreciation of tile
underlying common stock.
The computation of the holding period for restricted convertible
securities under Rule 144 s1 creates what may well become the pri-
mary means of avoiding full economic risk of investment during the
two year holding period. Prior to Rule 144, privately placed convertible
securities were governed by Rule 155.8 Under that rule any public
resale of a restricted convertible violated the 1933 Act, regardless of
investment intent or length of the holding period.80 The holding pe-
riod of common stock acquired through conversion of securities re-
lated back to the date of conversion. By contrast, Rule 144 views the
convertible security as a "package" of two securities. Conversion does
not start the holding period running anew, and the holding period
of the underlying common stock relates back to the acquisition of the
convertible, regardless of when the conversion was effected. 0 It is
easy to see that Rule 155 imposed far more economic risk than Rule
144. Under Rule 155 convertible securities did not minimize risk, for
distribution of the convertible was forbidden without registration., 1 If
an unregistered public sale was desired, it was necessary to exercise
the conversion option and hold the more risky common stock long
enough to satisfy the SEC. Rule 144 makes it possible to bear the
limited risk of a preferred issue during the two year holding period,
and then either exercise the conversion option and receive the market
price of the more risky underlying issue, or sell the convertible itself, at
a price reflecting the value of the underlying common stock. One of
86. INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, at 235; B. GRAIIA71 & D. Dowo, supra note
76, at 521-29.
The magnitude of price fluctuations is considered by economists to correspond to the
"riskiness" of an investment in a particular asset. See generally H. NARKOWITZ, supra
note 79.
87. Rule 144(d)(4)(B).
88. 17 C.F.R. § 230.155 (1972). Rule 144 rescinds Rule 155. 37 Fed. Reg. 596 (1972).
89. The Commission's rationale for requiring registration of all sales of restricted
convertible securities involves the following logical chain: (I) The private placement of
a security which is immediately convertible into another is an offer by the issuer of
two securities, with the offer of the underlying security continuing until the convertible
right is exercised or expires; (2) The corporate issuer has a direct, intimate and con.
tinuing connection with this offer of the underlying security; (3) A public sale of tile
convertible by the private placement purchaser would be a transaction involving the
issuer in a public offering of the underlying unregistered security in violation of the
1933 Act. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4162 (Dec. 2, 1959), SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4248 (July 14, 1960) (explaining Proposed Rule 155), and SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4450 (Feb. 7, 1962). For a commentator's elaboration of this rationale,
see Gadsby, Private Placement of Convertible Securities, 15 Bus. LAwYER 470 (1960).
90. Rule 144(d)(4)(B).
91. See, e.g., Emmanuel Deetjen & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Smt.
L. REP. 78,200 (1971).
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the principal features of private placements, as opposed to public fi-
nancing, is the ability of the issuer to tailor the characteristics of the
securities to the needs of the private purchaser.12 This makes it likely
that negotiation between issuers and prospective private placement
purchasers will lead to widespread use of convertible securities as a
means of avoiding investment risk.03
Sales by Affiliates. Pre-Rule 144 law recognized the community of
interest between a corporate issuer and a person controlling or con-
trolled by the issuer. Thus, a sale of unregistered stock by such a per-
son was held the equivalent of a transaction by the issuer.04 Under
Rule 144, however, the affiliate of an issuer is recognized as a person
distinct from the corporate issuer, free to engage in Rule 144 trans-
actions. The definition of an affiliate is "a person that directly, or in-
directly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled
by, or is under common control with, such issuer."95 The literal lan-
guage of Rule 144 would permit circumvention of the 1933 Act regis-
tration requirements by the use of subsidiaries. The issuing corpora-
tion could transfer its shares to a subsidiary under a Section 4(2) claim
of private financing. The subsidiary, after the two year holding period,
would be able to sell the restricted securities in Rule 144 transactions.
Of course, there would be no real "investment risk" borne by the sub-
sidiary, since its identity is merged with that of the issuer. The pro-
ceeds of the Rule 144 sale could ultimately be passed to the parent or
sister corporation by means of a loan, capital contribution, or divi-
dend. While such blatant exploitation of Rule 144 may not succeed,
less dramatic abuses are a realistic possibility. A case in point is the
position taken by the SEC staff that a controlled pension trust may
be an "affiliate" of the issuer under Rule 144 and may sell securities
of the parent in Rule 144 transactions.0
The treatment of affiliates is an area in which the fundamental prem-
ises of Rule 144, and not merely its mechanics, are highly questionable.
Even if some degree of investment risk is imposed on affiliates when
92. Epley, supra note 31, at 12; 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, supra note
34, at 2414.
93. Additional discussion of the increased attractiveness of convertible debt can be
found in Rice, Potential Effects of Pending Securities and Exchange Rules on Private
Financing and Business Acquisitions, 23 S'mrx. L. REv. 287, 2098 (1971).
94. The last clause of the definition of "underwriter" provides:
As used in this paragraph, the term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an
issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or
any person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer.
1933 Act § 2(11). See generally L. Loss, supra note 19, at 782.
95. Rule 144(a)(1).
96. Winkleman Stores, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. t 78,771
(1972).
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they purchase restricted securities from parent or sister entities, it is
far from clear that such risk will have the cautionary effect in pur-
chase decisions that it would have on an unaffiliated purchaser. Pur-
chases of an affiliate's securities are influenced by considerations other
than rational investment behavior, considerations which are capable
of overruling decisions that the risk factor might otherwise compel.
As a result, the protection provided the public by Rule 144 is signifi-
cantly weakened when a private placement purchaser is affiliated with
the issuer of the securities.
C. Quantity Limits
Under Rule 144 the quantity of restricted securities which a person
may sell within any six month period is restricted to the lesser of (1)
one per cent of the shares or other units of the class outstanding or
(2) the average weekly volume of trading in the security on all ex-
changes during the prior four calendar weeks. 7 This quantity limit
is designed to minimize the impact of sales of restricted securities on
the trading markets. It incidentally subjects the private placement pur-
chaser to a degree of illiquidity should he purchase a quantity too
large to be sold in a single six month period.
The limit imposed by Rule 144 does not achieve its goal of market
protection. It applies only to the individual holder of unregistered se-
curities and contains no overall provision to prevent market disrup-
tion caused by the aggregate effect of permissible individual transac-
tions.98 Thus, if each of twenty-five institutions privately holds one
97. Rule 144(e). If the security is not listed on an exchange the one per cent limit
applies.
In computing the quantity limits for affiliates, sales of restricted securities and "other"
securities are counted together. Rule 144(e)(1). This resembles a limited "Iunglbllty"
provision for affiliates only. See also p. 1587 supra.
Rule 144 limits may be contrasted with those of Rule 237, promulgated with Rule
144. 37 Fed. Reg. 590 (1972). Under Rule 237 any person not an issuer, affiliate of tle
issuer, or a broker or dealer may sell unregistered securities in negotiated transactions
if the securities have been held for five years and the issuer is a domestic organization
actively engaged in business as a going concern for at least the last five yecars. These
sales, however, are limited to one per cent of the class outstanding or $50,000, whichever
is less, in any twelve month period. In addition, the amount that may be sold under
the rule is reduced by sales made pursuant to an exemption under Regulation A, see
text infra, and under Rule 144 during the period.
98. Sales of restricted stock by pledgees and pledgors, dones and donors, trusts ad
the settlors of such trusts, estates and beneficiaries of such estates, and persons acting
in concert are aggregated in certain cases in computing the Rule 144 quantity limit.
Rule 144(e)(3) (i).(vi). Under pre-Rule 144 law the existence of a lari~e number of sales
of restricted securities by unrelated persons was relevant to a determination of whether
there had been an illegal distribution even if the persons had not acted iii concert. See,
e.g., Viatron Computer Systems Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Se. L.
REP. 78,052 (1971), Unicapital Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REt,.
78,123 (1971).
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per cent of the shares of the class outstanding, they may collectively
sell as much as twenty-five per cent of the outstanding shares within
a six month period.
The Rule 144 quantity limit should be contrasted with that of Regu-
lation A.99 Often called the small offering exemption, this regulation
permits an issuer publicly to sell up to $500,000 of securities per year
without registration under the 1933 Act. This total includes the amount
by which aggregate sales by non-controlling persons exceed $300,000.
Rule 144 clearly permits unregistered securities to enter the public
market in greater volume than would qualify as a small offering.
Rule 144 also permits sales up to the quantity limit within successive
six month periods.100 Thus up to one per cent of the class outstanding
or the average four week trading volume may be sold every six months.
This should be contrasted with Rule 154, which formerly governed
certain sales by controlling stockholders.' 0 ' Under that rule sales with-
in successive six month periods were deemed so "substantial" as to be
an illegal distribution. 02
Conclusion
No regulatory approach to the problems in this area could be per-
fectly prophylactic, but Rule 144 seems particularly porous. Happily,
the SEC states that the rule is experimental and that it will be re-
scinded or amended if experience proves that it is not operating for
the protection of the public. 0 3 The defects that have been discussed
deserve the Commission's prompt attention and corrective action.
99. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.262 (1972).
100. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, at 11 (Jan. 11, 1972). Jacobs, Persinger &
Parker, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. 78,945 (1972).
101. Rule 154 contained a definition of the term "distribution" which ias used in
determining the availability of an exemption for a brokerage transaction under § 4(4)
of the 1933 Act. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1972). Rule 154 was rescinded by Rule 144. 37
Fed. Reg. 596 (1972). Distributions generally were held not to include "transactions
involving an amount not substantial in relation to the number of shares or units of
the security outstanding and the aggregate volume of trading in such security." SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
102. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966); Computer Sciences Corp.,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED). SEC. L. Ra,. ' 78,175 (1971).
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 warns that technical compliance with the letter
of Rule 144 will not assure an exemption if the Rule 144 sales are part of a plan to
distribute securities to the public. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, at 13 (Jan. 11,
1972). This cryptic sentence does not revive the "intent to distribute" standard. Jacobs,
Persinger & Parker, [Current] CCH Fan. SEC. L. REP. 78,945 (1972). At any rate,
once objective standards defining distribution are set out, it may be extremely difficult
to halt an allegedly "illegal plan of distribution" which technically complies with the
rule. Cf. SEC v. Arco Industries, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCII FED. SEc, L.
REP. 92,921 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 18, 1971).
103. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, at 13 (Jan. 11, 1972).
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